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he President of the 
European Commission, 
José Manuel Barroso, has 
launched a brainstorming 
exercise about the future policy 
priorities for the development of 
the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ).
1 Migration 
                                                      
1 See Commission Communication, The European Interest: 
Succeeding in the Age of Globalisation,  COM(2007) 581 
final, Brussels 3.10.2007, which states:  “The EU is already 
working on many of the policy elements needed to equip it to 
take on the challenge of globalization with confidence…in 
the coming months, the Commission will be putting new 
ideas on the table to address these key challenges…Review 
of internal policies is already under way, aiming to reshape 
Europe to face gloablisation and give it the right platform to 
look beyond its borders.” Further the Communication 
identifies “Migration in a Globalized World” as one of the 
key political objectives and states: “In a Europe with no 
internal borders, the changing demands of an ageing society 
and a labour market in constant evolution have challenged 
established assumptions about immigration… a new global 
approach is needed so that migration strikes the right balance 
between the risk of labour market shortages, economic 
impacts, negative social consequences, integration policies 
and external policy objectives”. Information about the 
current financial Framework Programme on Solidarity and 
the Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007-
2013 and about the four Funds comprising it (European 
Refugee Fund, External Borders Fund, the European Return 
Fund and the European Integration Fund) can be found at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14509.htm See the 
original European Commission’s proposal in the 
Communication on a framework programme on Solidarity 
and the Management of Migration Flows for the period 
2007-2013, SEC(2005) 435, COM/2005/0123 final, 6 April 
2005. 
and borders will constitute two of the most relevant 
policies on which the next EU budget covering the 
AFSJ beyond 2013 will be focused. Migration 
represents one of the key dimensions in the EU agenda 
in light of globalisation and the demographic 
transformations of the region. The Commission plans to 
present a Communication on a European Migration 
Policy by June 2008. The upcoming French Presidency 
of the EU (July-December 2008) will focus on 
developing a common EU migration policy
2 and a 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (pacte 
européen pour l’immigration et l’asile).
3  
                                                      
2 According to a presentation of the French Prime Minister 
François Fillon to the Members of EPP and PSE Groups of 
the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the issues of 
immigration and asylum will constitute key priorities for the 
upcoming French Presidency. In particular, he stated:  “We 
will push for the harmonisation of the legislation on the 
matter, for better controls at the Union's borders and for an 
efficient development policy.” See the summary of his 
intervention (http://www.epp-
ed.eu/press/psess08/report0802_en.asp#02).  
3 According to information provided in the website of the 
French Government, this agreement will be based on the 
following principles: an improved control of the common EU 
external borders, the management of legal and labour 
T 
What Future for the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice?
Recommendations on EU Migration and 
Borders Policies in a Globalising World
Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera & Elspeth Guild2 | Bigo, Carrera & Guild 
It is expected that the French Presidency will closely 
collaborate with the European Commission to adopt a 
set of general policy guidelines on which the near-
future EU policy on immigration will be built. These 
principles will serve as the foundation for the successor 
to the Second Multi-annual Programme on an AFSJ, 
The Hague Programme (which runs from 2004 until the 
end of 2009), which will be adopted under the auspices 
of the Swedish Presidency (July-December 2009). This 
Policy Brief puts forward a package of policy 
recommendations covering the following three themes: 
I.  How to structure Justice and Home Affairs in the 
EU: to get the best results 
II.  Mastering the integration debate and 
comprehensively framing the citizen/foreigner/ 
immigrant relationship 
III. The utility of large-scale information systems with 
interoperable databases including biometric 
technology for the protection of people living in the 
EU. 
I.  Adjusting JHA in the European 
Commission to get value for money 
1.  The European Commission’s Directorate-General 
responsible for Justice and Home Affairs, denominated 
as DG Justice, Freedom and Security,
4 is relatively new 
– created after the 1999 reorganisation of the 
competences of the EU with the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. At that time the Commission was 
given the competence to enact EU law in the areas of 
borders, immigration and asylum (Title IV of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community). Judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and policing remained 
in the Third Pillar (Title VI Treaty on European 
Union). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the pillar structure in the AFSJ will end.
5 This is 
therefore the right moment to start thinking proactively 
about the possibilities for dividing the DG into three 
DGs – a Justice DG dealing with policing and judicial 
cooperation; a DG responsible for borders, immigration 
and asylum and a DG responsible for fundamental 
rights charged with ensuring that the democratic 
                                                                                           
immigration, management of the sustainable return of 
irregular immigrants (which would also include the 
organisation of joint flights and readmission agreements with 
third countries), the harmonisation of asylum regimes and a 
common approach on co-development and development aid. 




5 S. Carrera and F. Geyer (2007), The Reform Treaty and 
Justice and Home Affairs: Implications for the Common Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS Policy Brief No. 
141, CEPS, Brussels.  
concerns expressed by the European Parliament and EU 
bodies, such as the Fundamental Rights Agency and 
European Data Protection Supervisor, are properly 
followed up. Key to this third DG would be the 
allocation of substantial resources, commensurate with 
those of the other two, and weight to enable it to carry 
out its work effectively. Such a division of tasks would 
permit much better cooperation with the member states 
where there is a similar division of labour. It would also 
facilitate better delivery of policy objectives while 
meeting citizens’ expectations. Finally, it would reduce 
the contamination among these diverse policy areas 
which is occurring too often at present. 
2.  The European Commission needs to separate border 
and immigration policy issues from security 
imperatives. Border-crossing and migration only rarely 
engage security issues. Cross-border crime questions 
belong to the field of policing, particularly in the EU 
where much cross-border crime is committed across the 
control-free EU internal borders. They do not belong to 
the field of border controls and immigration. 
FRONTEX is not a substitute for or competitor to 
EUROPOL. Border controls are primarily about 
allowing visitors to enter the EU (the overwhelming 
majority of persons crossing the common external 
borders), and immigration is about attracting third-
country workers to the EU
6 and ensuring family 
reunification for those who are already here.  
3.  The European Commission’s key task in managing 
the external border of the EU must be founded solidly 
in law and the rule of law. The Commission’s work is 
cut out for it over the next 20 years at least to ensure 
that its newly adopted borders law, the Schengen 
Borders Code, is properly implemented in all the EU 
member states and by all the relevant EU agencies, 
wherever operating. The Borders Code is the EU’s 
basic law on who should cross the external border and 
how the internal border is managed. Expensive projects 
of uncertain results involving massive data collection 
and retention, biometrics, etc. should only be 
contemplated if there is clear evidence that they are 
central to implementing EU law.
7 So far the experiment 
initiated by the US Department of Homeland Security 
called the US-VISIT Program, which collects massive 
amounts of biometric data from visitors to the US, has 
proven to be extremely expensive with no apparent 
security gain. This sort of project does not offer value 
for money in comparison with policing procedures 
which are better targeted at security risks. 
                                                      
6 E. Guild (2007), EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First 
Look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 145, CEPS, Brussels.  
7 See E. Guild, S. Carrera and F. Geyer (2008), The 
Commission’s New Border Package: Does it take us one step 
closer to ‘cyber-fortress Europe’?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 
154, CEPS, Brussels.  What Future for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? | 3 
II.  Mastering the integration debate and 
comprehensively framing the citizen/ 
foreigner/immigrant relationship 
1.  The integration debate needs to be disentangled 
from insecurity and immigration control. The use of 
integration as a mandatory state criterion to limit the 
legal channels of regular immigration is neither 
consistent with the way the EU has dealt with 
immigration and integration, nor is it coherent with the 
EU’s new motto – ‘united in diversity’. The principle 
of fair and near-equality for resident third-country 
nationals with EU citizens agreed at the Tampere 
Summit in 1999 should continue guiding EU law and 
policy. The fact that some member states aim to limit 
the European competence over immigration by using 
the subjective condition of integration, and to restrict 
the latter to the confines of their own legislation, is 
counterproductive to the political project of a common 
EU immigration policy. Also, diversity is a strength of 
the EU – not a defect in need of correction. It is not 
consistent to argue that migration weakens the EU 
because it may add to diversity.  
2.  The dual challenges of a demographic 
transformation of the EU which point to a contracting 
market through the reduction of fertility and the aging 
of Europe through the continuous extension of life 
expectancy requires a dramatic re-thinking of EU 
policies towards third-country nationals. The EU must 
become a more welcoming place to those who seek 
work and will enhance our economy. The use of 
integration as a condition to make residence for third-
country nationals in a member state precarious and 
uncertain is an obstacle to providing the environment 
where third-country nationals may be willing to invest 
their energy and vitality in the EU. However, that 
investment by third-country nationals will be an 
important component in avoiding a dramatic 
contraction of the EU economy and the provision of 
key services to the elderly. A serious deficit is currently 
apparent in the delivery of fundamental rights in the EU 
particularly to third-country nationals. Turning around 
this deficit so that third country nationals are welcomed 
into the EU and enjoy fundamental rights in a 
framework of equality will take concerted efforts by the 
EU institutions over the next 20 years. 
3.  Combating social exclusion is one of the great 
challenges that the EU will face in the coming 20 years. 
In particular, with the aging of the population, ensuring 
that the elderly do not fall into social exclusion and that 
intergenerational solidarity is a reality will require 
complex strategies. Providing the environment in which 
the cohort of younger third country nationals already 
growing up in the EU are able to realise their potential 
and avoid social exclusion is critical. To this end, 
initiatives that tend to isolate and separate young third-
country nationals resident in the EU should be avoided 
as counterproductive. Differential treatment of 
Europe’s young third-country nationals in comparison 
with nationals who are citizens, or worse, differential 
treatment of young citizens on the basis of where their 
parents or grandparents were born is stigmatising and 
excluding by definition. Instruments such as mandatory 
integration contracts on the side of immigrants as a 
criterion for having access to a secure legal status and 
being treated equally and fairly are a good example of 
how to foster social exclusion and separation in a 
diverse Europe. Social exclusion must be treated as the 
social ill that it is for all the EU’s people founded as it 
is in economic exclusion. It must not be constructed 
around ethnic origin. 
III.  The utility of large-scale information 
systems with interoperable databases, 
including biometric technology for the 
protection of people living in the EU 
1.  The European Commission is committed to assure a 
better protection of all the individuals living in the EU, 
and to analyse what complementary measures can be 
taken at the EU level. It is an important task to carry 
out good communication among all the member states 
and the EU agencies in charge of this protection. The 
questions of adequacy and proportionality of the flow 
of information need to be addressed in order to avoid 
the idea that maximum technology is by definition the 
solution for better security. Gathering all the possible 
information is not a guarantee of adequacy. On the 
contrary, it substitutes human capacity to deal with a 
certain number of data, with computer-assisted models 
that have the capacity to deal with large numbers of 
data, but not intelligently when dealing with human 
behaviour and strategies. BIG is not a sign of 
efficiency.  
2.  Total information awareness is a security mistake 
that creates surveillance and resistance to it - leading to 
more contest, including that of a violent nature. A 
security that is reduced to the technology of 
surveillance without limit, which invades privacy, is 
contrary to the protection of both the individual and 
collective safety.
8 It undermines social cohesion of 
societies, especially when the grounds for suspicion are 
not as such a risk for collective security (for instance 
overstaying third-country nationals are not a threat to 
collective security of the same sort as clandestine 
organisations using violence).  
                                                      
8 See D. Bigo, S. Carrera, R.B.J. Walker and E. Guild (2007), 
The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: 
Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE 
Project, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 4, February 
2007. See Section B.2. on “Increasing Suspicion, Developing 
Technologies of Surveillance and Their Impact on Freedom”. 4 | Bigo, Carrera & Guild 
3.  The exchange of information has to be specified and 
channelled carefully through trusted agencies, and not 
largely disseminated among very different kinds of 
networks. The claims that any form of mobility is a 
security deficit leading to an increased danger for the 
EU collective identity and safety are not substantiated. 
It is against the very idea of freedom of movement and 
of citizenship at the EU level to consider neighbours 
and foreigners as potentially hostile. The EU projects 
(as they have been framed in the new Commission’s 
Border Package, and in the relation to agreements with 
third countries on mass intelligence) cannot be a 
solution for the future. It is important to create 
instruments that do not escape EU law through an 
open-ended network of exchange of information with  
third countries’ governments, in the name of efficiency 
regarding collecting information, especially when 
communication is extending beyond the sphere of 
liberal regimes. Limits concerning the sharing of 
information, the connection between levels of 
information, the quality of agencies exchanging data 
and the implications of third-country participation have 
to be politically and openly discussed. In doing so, the 
European Commission should avoid the tendency to 
reduce specific political dilemmas to technological 
solutions. This is particularly so when the providers of 
solutions claim that the same solution (biometrics-
database-profiling) is applied to every problem 
(terrorism, crime, fraud, irregular crossing, 
overstaying), because it is claimed to be able to predict 
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